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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the interest of Teey G. a person 
under 18 years of age. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant H G appeals from an 
order given pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
55-10-109 (1953) terminating her parental rights to her 
minor son, T G 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon hearings before the Honorable Charles E. Brad-
ford, Judge of the First District Juvenile Court, it was 
determined that the parental rights of the appellant 
H G be terlminated with respect to 
T G , and an order was issued to that 
end. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the Juvenile Court's 
Case No. 
13728 
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findings and sustaining of the Court order terminating 
parental rights. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of 
facts with the following inclusions and exceptions. 
1. The appellant, H G testified as 
to previous children who were removed involuntarily from 
her (T. 211-212). 
2. Testimony was given as to a continuing condition 
of poor housekeeping which established some type of 
pattern of appellant's behavior (T. 17-70). 
3. The termination order was not signed solely be-
cause of conditions which caused other children to be 
taken, as appellant's statement of facts purports, but 
Judge Bradford took notice that the other children must 
have been taken for some valid reason (T. 321). 
4. No formal order was prepared outlining the con-
ditions to be met in the six month test period, and ap-
pellant's attorney who was the only one present when 
the order was changed failed to inform both the counsel 
for the minor child and the counsel for the State that 
a change had been made (T. 334-340). 
5. The Department of Social Services received only 
a copy of a letter sent to H G 's Bishop 
which set out as best as he could remember, the appel-
lant's counsel's version of the requirements made by the 
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judge. No formal notice was ever given that the Depart-
ment need do anything. 
6. Respondent disputes the terminology used in 
appellant's statement of facts regarding "expressed hos-
tility and prejudice towards the appellant and her attor-
ney." (Appellant's Brief page 5.) That is clearly a per-
sonal judgment by counsel and no such findings are sub-
stantiated by the record (T. 386-390). 
7. T G had been placed in homes 
and had been with families for baby sitting purposes, 
under the supervision of the Department of Social Ser-
vices several times since H G had been 
in Logan. The night of April 27, 1973, was not the only 
time the appellant had had such relationships with the 
Department of Social Services of the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TAKING NOTICE THAT GOOD REASON 
MUST HAVE EXISTED FOR PREVIOUS 
CHILDREN TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY 
FROM APPELLANT DOES NOT CONSTI-
TUTE PREJUDICIAL OR REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
The appellant's brief makes it appear that the Juv-
enile Court relied in its decision almost exclusively on a 
statement by Judge Bradford that "the court had just 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cause to remove the other children from the home . . . " 
(T. 321). The appellant testified that several children 
had been involuntarily removed. Under the laws of the 
State of Utah it is to be assumed that such children will 
have been taken away only for good cause. The court 
admitted and stated perfectly well, that it did not review 
any previous records and therefore was not basing its 
decision on the records it did not admit into evidence. 
This intent and fact is represented in Judge Bradford's 
own words: 
Well, you may recall, Mr. Hillyard, that 
there was a motion that the Court review the 
earlier testimony and you resisted that motion 
and I think you were justified in resisting the 
motion, however, the Court indicated that I 
would not review that testimony except on 
stipulation of counsel. Now, if you felt that 
it was appropriate that I have an opportunity 
to compare the situation now with the situation 
before, and counsel all agreed that that was 
appropriate for me to do, although under it 
wouldn't under ordinary circumstances be 
irregular, then I certainly would have been 
willing to take the time to listen to that. But, 
I have to, it may be that there has been more 
change since then, but I don't know all the 
reasons Judge Anderson might have had in 
mind when terminating as to these other 
children. There may have been more change 
than I assume. I just can't get away from 
picturing in my mind of this little boy having 
to be with babytenders all day. And really 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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needing his mother and really needing the 
warm strong meaningful ties of his mother. 
The appellant admits in her brief that the court gave 
no reasons for finding that allegations one, two, and three 
had been proven, but that in itself, custody did not need 
to be terminated on those grounds alone. (Appellant's 
brief p. 3.) Yet, the appellant contends in his argument 
that the judge relied substantially on past behavior and 
conditions in his decision, and that this is reversible error. 
Such substantial acknowledgment of the judge's reasons 
for so holding are not found in the record. As stated 
above, such prior reasons were not used. All inferences, 
except the small segment quoted by appellant, discuss 
and point to the present conditions of the child and its 
mother. It is not reversible error merely to take notice 
that some valid reason must have existed for the other 
children to be taken when the appellant, herself, testified 
to the fact that they were involuntarily taken from her. 
This makes light of reason and the decision making pro* 
cess, and infers that testimony given cannot be used to 
analyze the totality of the situation. 
Frank v. State, 7 Utah 2d 245, 322 P. 2d 397 (1958), 
is cited by appellant in an attempt to impose precedent 
for the present fact situation. The Juvenile Judge made 
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law incorporat-
ing findings of a divorce decree from a totally different 
court as to the lack of fitness of a father and discounted 
any evidence properly admitted to sustain the father's 
suitability. The court properly ruled that this was error, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for the facts of that case bear the decision out. The court 
concluded: 
The Juvenile Court did not have before 
it any evidence to establish appellant's unfit-
ness to have the custody of his children. 
In effect, the Supreme Court rejected the use by the 
Juvenile Court of evidence from another trial in another 
court without independent evidence to support the find-
ing. The Juvenile Court could not properly conclude 
that the father was unfit. 
In the case at bar, there was ample evidence before 
the court of the present status of the mother, making 
any reference to previous conditions superfluous as to 
paramount meaning. No reliance on other decisions was 
needed to ascertain the mother's unfitness, and in fact 
the only reference to such previous decisions is the fol-
lowing statements by Judge Bradford found on page 321 
as quoted by the appellant as well: 
I realize that a person can change, I even 
realize that a person can change late in life, 
but I don't see evidence of the kind of changes 
most recently in Mrs. Gullett's life that would 
indicate a real recognition that she needs to 
change or a willingness to set aside her own 
personal feelings and desires to make the 
sacrifice, to pay the price to do the extremely 
difficult job of being both mother and father 
to this little boy. To see that he gets the entire 
upbringing that her other children didn't have. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Though Judge Bradford indicated some basic criteria 
to which he compares the present situation as argued by 
the appellant as error ,the facts indicate, with little res-
ervation, the status of H G 's life and 
home at the time of the hearing. Knowing these present 
conditions, all that would need to be deduced is the fol-
lowing to arrive at the conclusion of the court: 
Setting aside any reason for the removal 
of the previous children, if conditions were 
worse at that time, her improvement has been 
unsubstantial to warrant the court allowing 
her to have custody. If conditions were the 
same as now, no change has been made and the 
present conditions are unacceptable. If con-
ditions were better previously, then her retro-
gression to the presence status satisfied the 
court as to her unfitness. 
Thus any measuring point need only be of a cursory 
nature since the present conditions are clear. The prev-
ious reference to "other children" and a willingness to 
change is solely compared to the present testimony and 
the judge's interpretation of how that relates to the fit-
ness of the mother. 
In State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P. 2d 395 
(1970), cited by appellant, the issue involved a Social 
Services report which could not be introduced into evi-
dence because of the type of hearsay information it con-
tained, but where the judge nevertheless based his de-
cision on such non-admitted evidence. There, the court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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said that the evidence exclusive of the non-admitted re-
port was insufficient to connect the mother's actions with 
any detrimental effect on the child. As to that non-ad-
mitted report, the court said that it was a: 
. . . denial of due process of law, since 
appellant had no opportunity to know, cross-
examine, explain, or rebut this secret evidence. 
Clearly, the present record is at exact opposites as to 
evidence substantiating a harmful connection between 
the mother and the child. Lance indicated that insuffi-
cient other evidence existed, whereas here, the record 
is full of such references. 
Lance, further stated that: 
To support a decision to deprive the par-
ent of its child the court must first be convinced 
of such fact by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Sufficient evidence exists to clearly fulfill this test. The 
trial judge is the one who hears and discerns the sincerity, 
truthfulness, and weight of witnesses and accused per-
sons. Simply because the appellant claims the Judge re-
lied mainly on past decisions does not mean it is so, and 
in fact is disputed by the statements contained in the 
record. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is clear 
that if error does exist and if it is inconsequential to the 
outcome, that such error will not cause a ruling to be 
overturned. The rule says as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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No error in either the admission or the 
exclusions of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, 
is ground for granting a new trial or other-
wise disturbing a judgment or order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding 
which does not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties. 
Further, in In re State in the Interest of K 
B , 7 Utah 2d 398, 326 P. 2d 395 (1958), the 
court held: 
Due to the extreme concern of courts for 
the welfare of children, proceedings in their 
interest are sometimes stated to be equitable 
in the higest degree, because the most careful 
consideration will be given such matters. In 
equity proceedings we are charged with the 
responsibility of reviewing the evidence; and 
it is the established rule that we will not dis-
turb the findings and determination made un-
less they are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence, or the court abused its discretion, 
(emphasis added) 
This position was later upheld in In re State in the Inter-
est of C, 9 Utah 2d 345, 344 P. 2d 981 (1959). The court, 
therefore upholds decisions based upon the weight of the 
evidence. No abuse of discretion has been shown or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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proved by appellant. The court should therefore sustain 
the Juvenile Court. 
Not only did prior situations not control the order 
so issued, but Judge Bradford held another hearing six 
months later to make sure he was correct and to give 
the appellant every opportunity to show improvement 
meritorious of receiving custody of T. G. The claimed 
error took place in June, 1973 and only after six months 
later, after another hearing was the judge convinced that 
the order must stand. Surely, the appellant cannot claim 
that the judge was "closed minded" in the January, 1974 
bearing, when on his own initiative wanted that hearing 
to determine the correctness of his judgment. If any-
thing, this mitigates the prior error complained of if error 
there was. The Judge corrected and reaffirmed the posi-
tion of the court. 
In light of Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, In re State in the interest of K B , 
and the facts cited above, respondent urges this court 
to sustain the Juvenile Court. This matter did not in-
volve use of prejudicial, nonnadmitted evidence as the 
basis of decision nor was the evidence allowed insuffi-
cient to sustain the court's findings. It is therefore, sub-
mitted by respondent that no prejudicial error, if any, 
took place as suggested by appellant. If, however, this 
court holds that error did indeed take place, the respon-
dent urges the court to recognize that in light of the rec-
ord, the error was harmless as to the outcome of the de-
cision. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED SUSTAINS 
THE DECISION OF THE J U V E N I L E 
COURT AND IS NOT INSUFFICIENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
To be upheld as a matter of law, the evidence pre-
sented by the appellant must outweigh in every detail 
the evidence supporting the findings of the Juvenile 
Court. The record does not sustain that position. Suf-
ficient testimony and fact was introduced at the hearing 
to fulfill the preponderance test cited under Point I. 
John Gaddish, a former neighbor of several months 
testified that he had gone into appellant's home to adjust 
the thermostat to his apartment on various occasions and 
found the house in a complete mess (T. 17-20). Dog 
waste, dirty diapers, garbage and the like were on the 
floor, etc. (T. 18). He further testified that he saw 
numerous men come and stay over night fifteen to twenty 
times (T. 35). Also that he had never seen a babysitter 
but saw the mother go out frequently (T. 25-26). 
Alan Nelson, a police officer who went to appellant's 
home on April 27, 1973, testified that there were beer 
cans and garbage all over the house, that there weren't 
any clean diapers to be found and that dog waste was 
on the floor (T. 48-49). 
Delilah Everhart, a babysitter who had cared for 
T G , testified that T "smelled 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
bad" most of the time when he was brought to her (T. 
255), that T. G 's bottle usually had sour 
milk in it, (T. 259) and that changes of clothes were sel-
dom brought. Mrs, Everhart continued, that she had 
visited appellant's apartment once due to T. 
G 's not being brought by. On this occasion the 
aparatment was in a real mess (T. 260). 
Dorothy Craeger, a girlfriend of appellant testified 
that at times appellant's home was messy and other times 
not (T. 276). Further, she testified that appellant had 
threatened her not to testify (T. 277), that appellant 
frequently had men in her home (T. 281) and that ap-
pellant had men stay over night (T. 282). 
As relating to this testimony, the appellant refuted 
all adverse testimony by saying it was not so (T. 189-
192). More precisely, she testified that her house was 
not messy when she left the night of April 27th (T. 189) 
even though the baby sitter, Patty Craeger described it 
as a mess when she arrived and the police officer testified 
of the unpleasant odor and garbage from prolonged per-
iods (T. 48). 
At the hearing six months later, the appellant testi-
fied that she didn't know a Browny Hansen (T. 349), 
but after several witnesses had testified to seeing her 
with him, she admitted knowing him (T. 422). Appellant 
further gave confusing and contradictory testimony re-
garding a supposed date and wedding of a friend which 
took place in Nevada. Her date registered for a room 
in the name of "Mr. & Mrs. David Thatcher" (T. 426). 
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Appellant testified first that three rooms were registered 
for (T. 362). In later testimony she retracted that state-
ment and said that only two rooms were used but that 
they only used them to cleanup and that she was never 
in the room alone with Mr. Thatcher (T. 428). She said 
they stayed over night (T. 362) yet in her later statement 
said that they came back early the next morning. 
Appellant further testified that she had gone out of 
the county only once (T. 355) whereupon it was estab-
lished that she had gone to Idaho and had seen Browny 
Hansen (T. 403) as well as to Nevada (T. 362). Mel 
Mower, a friend and acquaintance of Mr. Hansen testi-
fied that Browny was married at that time (T. 418). 
On one occasion, when Mr. Gayle Morgan, the Social 
Worker in charge of T G 's case arrived 
late in taking T G to appellant, a gentle-
man was in the kitchen sitting quietly at a table. Appel-
lant testified that he was the husband of a girlfriend who 
dropped in for five minutes to see how she was (T. 341, 
348). Mr. Morgan testified that he was told the man 
was appellant's cousin or some relation (T. 374), and 
that he was there to fix the car (T. 386). Mr. Morgan 
further stated that the car parked outside had Idaho 
license plates (T. 385). Yet on another occasion when 
Mr. Morgan was late in picking T G up 
to return him to the foster family, appellant had liquor 
on her breath (T. 366-374). 
From the record it is clear that extensive evidence ex-
ists bearing on appellant's actions, habits, fitness, and 
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change over the six month period. Respondent has not 
attempted to recount testimony supportive of appellant's 
fitness. Such is found in appellant's own brief. When 
examining and comparing the record, however, it cannot 
seriously be contended that the evidence is conclusivce 
"as a matter of law" that custody should remain in 
H G To be a "matter of law", the rec-
ord must be so clear, so unambiguous, and so persuasive, 
that the court must have disregarded that great weight 
of evidence to rule otherwise. Respondent represents that 
neither this standard, nor any like standard has been 
met by appellant. 
Respondent emphasizes in pointing out to the court, 
that many contradictions and inconsistencies are appar-
ent in appellant's own testimony, which leads respondent 
to the conclusion that appellant exerted "self serving in-
terests". The purpose being the return of custody 
of her child. The statements of other witnesses gave 
ample opportunity for the court to weigh this self-serving 
interest with all the testimony and fact. This the court 
did and ruled against appellant. 
Therefore, respondent submits that the record sus-
tains the judgment of the court and that the appelant 
fails to uphold her strict burden of proving as "a matter 
of law" that the record supports a different position than 
held by the Juvenile Court. As stated in State v. Lance, 
supra: 
To support a decision to deprive the par-
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ent of its child the court must first be convinced 
of such fact by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Such criteria have been fulfilled making it apparent that 
this court must sustain such findings. 
POINT III. 
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES 
DID COMPLY WITH THE COURT'S OR-
DER AS FAR AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND DUE TO PROB-
LEMS CREATED BY APPELLANT'S OWN 
COUNSEL APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE 
ABLE TO CLAIM ERROR. 
Appellant's brief under issue number 3 inaccurately 
reports that the final court order was prepared and the 
contents thereof forwarded to the Division of Family Ser-
vices. The record contains the following dialogue on page 
333: 
Attorney Sorenson: No, your Honor. 
And another problem with that, your Honor, 
we have no way of knowing what the Court's 
Order was, what those conditions were. There 
has never been an Order transcribed or issued 
or . . . 
Attorney Hillyard: Your Honor, excuse 
me, may I just indicate that for the record that 
I did not prepare a formal Order, I anticipated 
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that the County Attorney's Office would do 
it, and I did not, but I did write a letter on 
June 21st, 1973, to Bishop Welsh, who is 
Mrs. (G 's) Bishop, I did send a copy 
of that to Mr. Gayle Morgan, Division of 
Family Services, which generally outlined the 
conditions as stated by the Court from my 
notes, from the Court Order, (emphasis added) 
As to any information the attorneys for the State 
and the child had, a letter from the court was sent, but 
the following is all it said: 
First of all we tried to catch you, but 
were unable to do so. Second, a slight modifi-
cation to the Order was my own idea, and was 
not induced by representations of any other 
persons. Third, the only change I made in the 
Order was I was continued disposition in the 
case for six months rather than have the Order 
go into effect immediately and I set some 
very stringent conditions that must be met 
before Mrs. (G ) will be allowed to 
have T in her home (T. 332). 
The Appellant H G was not even 
informed of the requirements to be met, let alone any 
formal binding notice to the Department of Family Ser-
vices. In a dialogue between the appellant and the court, 
the following is found on page 343: 
Q. And, Mr. Hillyard didn't ever tell you 
that I 'd made any change in the Order? 
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A. I only understood that I could have visit-
ing rights to him. 
Q. Then you were never informed of any 
other type of arrangements by Mr. Hill-
yard or by Mr. Morgan or by anyone 
from Family Services other than Mr. 
Morgan? 
A. No sir. 
Mr. Morgan testified that he never received formal 
notice of any order, but that he had received a phone 
call relating to it (T. 364). His understanding was as 
Mrs. G 's in that H G was to 
be given her son if her behavior improved (T. 365). 
Mr. Hillyard said his letter "generally outlined" the 
conditions, which outline was taken "from my notes". 
I t becomes apparent that appellant is now basing her 
appeal on error or misunderstanding induced and per-
petuated by her own counsel who also is representing 
appellant on appeal. This court has established that such 
error induced or carried on by appellant or appellant's 
attorney cannot be grounds for appeal. (See Pettingill 
v. Perkings, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 184 (1954) and 
Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 
221,137 P. 2d 347 (1943).) 
Clearly the error, if any, was in not getting the full 
and complete order of the court to the parties so they 
could act thereon. Though the court may have also been 
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at fault in not following through, appellant's attorney was 
the only attorney present when the original order was 
modified and appellant's attorney made some attempt, 
though obviously not sufficient, to convey the new terms 
to other involved parties. Attorney Hillyard further in-
dicated before the court that he had never made the re-
quest to the Division of Family Services that H 
G be given the child; only that he had attempted 
to work through her Bishop, but that he and the Bishop 
never got together (T. 331). 
With this confusion as to the requirements of the 
order, it was totally proper and fitting that Mr. Morgan 
move forward as best he could in working with the situa-
tion. As he testified, it was his belief and therefore his 
plan of action that any change in circumstances must 
come from appellant: 
A. Ah, our agency has worked with Mrs. 
(G ) for several years. We have 
had the relief society many people try to 
help her. After a while you get so you 
don't think there's much use trying. 
And this was my attitude with Mrs. 
G ) . 
Q. Okay. 
A. We have tried, our agency has spent 
many hours with Mrs. (G ) over 
the last year. Before, after the removal 
of the other children or prior to them, to 
them and so this is part of the reasons why 
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I didn't, I felt she had to change, do the 
changing herself. 
Mrs. G knew that she would have to adjust 
or she would not get her child. The court did not find 
that that change had been made and that the misunder-
standing over the court order was not crucial: 
The Court: I t was my intent that partic-
ularly in view of the fact that I modified the 
original Order that all counsel have copies of 
it and be informed and if that wasn't done, then 
my intentions were not carried out. In any 
event, I think the only thing that we could do 
now is to go ahead and see what the situation 
is and see if there is a compelling reason to 
vacate the previous Order (T. 333). 
It appears from the record that the appellant's at-
torney helped prolong this confusion as to the original 
order, that the Division of Family Services took the 
course of action it deemed proper under the circum-
stances, and that the Juvenile Court did not find the 
provision relied on by appellant as necessary in light of 
the evidence placed before it. This contention of appel-
lant should therefore be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
It was not prejudicial error for the Juvenile Court 
to take notice that conditions must have existed previ-
ously which would warrant the removal of other children. 
The evidence and testimony of the present situation not 
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only refute this contention but clearly establish that 
this court cannot hold the evidence as nonsupportive 
of the judgment as "as a matter of law". The Division 
of Family Services further did what it deemed proper 
under the circumstances to aid the appellant. It is there-
fore requested that this court sustain the judgment of 
the Juvenile Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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